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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of privatization in a mixed duopoly, where 
a private firm competes in quantities with a welfare-maximizing public firm. We consider two 
inefficiencies of the public sector: a possible cost inefficiency, and an allocative inefficiency 
due to the distortionary effect of taxation (shadow cost of public funds). Furthermore, we 
analyze the effect of privatization on the timing of competition by endogenizing the 
determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games using 
the model developed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). The latter is especially relevant for the 
analysis of privatization, given that results and policy prescription emerged in the literature 
crucially rely on the type of competition assumed. We show that privatization has generally 
the effect of shifting from Stackelberg to Cournot equilibrium and that, absent efficiency gains 
privatization never increases welfare. Moreover, even when large efficiency gains are realized, 
an inefficient public firm may be preferred. 
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1 Introduction
In the last decades of the XX century a process of liberalization and/or privatization occurred
in most of the industrialized countries and, since then, public utilities are generally no longer
provided by public monopolies. The motivations for this program were essentially linked to
the general perception of poor performance of public monopolies and to the idea that entry of
private subjects could enhance efficiency. For example, during the nineties, in Italy, in France
and in UK, as in many EU countries, the public incumbent faced the entry of private com-
petitors in many communication services. The same occurred in the production of electricity,
in gas retailing and more recently in some postal services. In the same years, national (public)
airlines started competing with private or foreign ones in the domestic markets. Moreover,
examples of public monopolies that became mixed oligopoly can be found in a broad range of
industries including railways, steel and overnight-delivery industries, as well as services includ-
ing banking, home loans, health care, life insurance, hospitals, broadcasting, and education.1
In these cases, instead of regulating a privatized monopoly, governments decided to enforce a
facility-based competitions in order to achieve a so-called dynamic efficiency.2
Our analysis starts downward the liberalization process of a public monopoly, and the aim
of the present work is to evaluate the effects of the following privatization. Since we mainly
refer to public utility markets open to competition, we consider a mixed duopoly in which
firms are characterized by increasing returns to scale (with fixed and constant marginal costs)
and we assume that the public firm is typically less efficient than its private competitor.3
The first novel contribution of this paper is represented by the introduction of the shadow
cost of public funds in the public firm’s objective function. That is, we assume that the
public firm is required to take into account the distortionary effect of the taxes that are
needed to cover its deficit and, in general, public expenditures. In fact, absent lump-sum tax
instruments, if government rises 1 Euro from taxation, society pays (1 + λ) Euros. Coher-
ently, public profits, when positive, avoid an equivalent public transfer, reducing distortionary
taxes.4 As initially analyzed in Meade (1944) and exploited in Laffont and Tirole (1986, 1993),
this approach has been used to characterize public monopolies running a deficit and, more
generally, regulated markets. Here we apply the same analysis to a public firm competing in a
duopoly and to the effects of privatization, given that getting money for reducing public debt or
distortionary taxes, is often a complementary target of privatization. The main consequence
is that, taking into account the shadow cost of public funds, the public firm puts more weight
1In industrial organization the term mixed oligopolies has been used to describe imperfectly competitive
markets in which public firms compete with private ones.
2For deeper viewpoints on the role played by facility-based competition in EU and US Telecommunications
liberalization and regulation processes see Taschdjian (1997) and Stehmann and Borthwick (1994).
3Differently from Cremer et al. (1989), the public firm’s higher cost is not a neutral transfer from firm to
workers belonging to the same economy but, as an X−inefficiency, it reduces any utilitarian measure of welfare.
4Since public firm’s profit or deficit are not a neutral transfer among agents of the same economy, they ought
not to be weighted as private firm’s profits or consumer net surplus in the utilitarian measure of welfare, but
they should be weighted (1 + λ).
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on its own profits mimicking, at least partially, the behavior of a private firm.
The second contribution of this work is that we consider the effect of privatization on
the timing of competition by endogenizing the determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot)
versus sequential (Stackelberg) games. That is, the structure of the game is not assumed a
priori, but is the result of preplay independent and simultaneous decisions by the players. In
fact, in many economic situations it is often more reasonable to assume that firms choose not
only what action to take, but also when to take it. Moreover, we believe that this approach is
especially relevant for the analysis of privatization, given that results and policy prescriptions
emerged in the literature crucially rely on the type of competition assumed. For example, in
de Fraja and Delbono (1989) it is shown that privatization may improve welfare under Cournot
competition even without efficiency gains; while, if a Stackelberg game with public leadership
is exogenously assumed, this cannot occur.5 In another paper, Beato and Mas-Colell (1984)
show that welfare may be higher when the public firm is the follower than when it is the leader
in a Stackelberg game. In this way they provided an argument against the standard view of
the so-called Second-Best literature (see, for example, Rees, 1984; Bo¨s, 1986) that claimed the
sub-optimality of the marginal-cost pricing rule.6
In the present work, in order to endogenize the timing of the game, we apply the model de-
veloped by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) to the mixed oligopoly framework. In their insightful
paper, the authors build an endogenous timing game by adding to the basic quantity game
a preplay stage at which players simultaneously and independently decide whether to move
early or late in the basic game. Therefore, the type of competition endogenously emerges in
the subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) of this extended game. Amir and Grilo (1999) apply
this model to a private duopoly showing that, in a quantity setting with strategic substi-
tutability, Cournot equilibria always result as the SPE of the endogenous timing game. Pal
(1998) addresses the issue of endogenous order of moves in a mixed oligopoly by adopting the
same game structure. It is shown that sequential playing always emerges as the endogenous
timing and both Stackelberg solutions are the SPE of the mixed-duopoly game. Even though
after Pal (1998) other authors analyzed the endogenous timing in mixed oligopolies, there is
no work, at our best knowledge, that extends this line of research to the welfare evaluation of
privatization.7
The main results of our analysis can be summed up as follows.
With respect to the determination of the endogenous timing in mixed oligopoly, our results
differ from Pal (1998), since in our model setting either Nash, or private leadership or both
Stackelberg outcomes can result as subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE) of the endogenous timing
game. Moreover, following the intuition of Beato and Mas-Colell (1984), we show that when
5The assumption of decreasing returns to scale is fundamental to their result that privatization may increases
welfare. This is generally not the case of a public utility provider.
6See de Fraja and Delbono (1990) for a survey of these models.
7Matsumura (2003), Cornes and Sepahvand (2003) and Sepahvand (2004) apply the same model to interna-
tional mixed oligopolies finding that public leadership may emerge as the unique SPE of the endogenous timing
game.
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both Stackelberg game are SPE of the endogenous timing game, private leadership is preferred
by the public firm and it is indeed selected when risk-dominance is used as the equilibrium
selection criterion.
With respect to the evaluation of the welfare impact of privatization, differently from
de Fraja and Delbono (1989), we find that, absent efficiency gains, privatization never increases
welfare and that, even when large efficiency gains are realized by privatization, an inefficient
public firm may be preferred. The last result relies on the fact that only with a public
firm sequential outcomes (that are always welfare superior) may be supported as SPE of the
endogenous timing game. Conversely, with private-owned firms, simultaneous equilibria are
always implemented.
It is worth noting that our results are obtained in a context of complete information,
and under the assumption that government has the full bargaining power in the privatization
process; that is, the price paid by the new private owners for the former public firm is assumed
to be equal to its profit in the new (Cournot) equilibrium. This assumption drives the results
in favor of privatization, since it overweights the revenue from privatization by λ in any welfare
comparison.
In what follows, the next Section sets up the model. Section 3 is focused on the issue of en-
dogenous timing in mixed oligopoly, while Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of privatization.
Our conclusions are delegated to Section 5. All the proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 The basic setting
In a static, partial equilibrium analysis, we consider the simplest setting of a mixed duopoly,
where a private and a public firm, respectively labeled with i = p, g, produce a commodity and
compete in a quantity game. Demand preferences are described by a linear function where
intercept and slope are normalized to one:
p (qg, qp) = 1− qp − qg
Both firms are characterized by constant marginal costs, ci ≥ 0, and fixed costs, Ki ≥ 0,
corresponding to irreversible investments.8 We assume that the public firm is already in the
market and its fixed cost is sunk. Conversely, the private firm’s fixed cost is borne only in
case of producing. Moreover, the private firm’s marginal cost is normalized to zero, cp = 0,
while the public firm’s one is positive, cg = c ≥ 0. That means, c is an index of the public
firm’s inefficiency.
The private firm maximizes its profit:
Πp (qg, qp) = (1− qg − qp) qp −Kp
8We consider that the assumption of increasing returns to scale is coherent with the presence of a public
incumbent, former monopolist, in a liberalized public utility industry. Nevertheless, the assumption decreasing
return to scale is popular in the literature. For papers adopting constant marginal costs, see Cremer et al.
(1989) and Martin (2004); while for papers adopting increasing marginal costs, see Beato and Mas-Colell (1984),
de Fraja and Delbono (1989), Fjell and Pal (1996), Pal and White (1998), Matsumura (1998).
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The public firm maximize an utilitarian measure of welfare taking into account the shadow cost
of public funds, λ > 0. This parameter is a measure of the dead-weight loss due to distortionary
taxation. In particular, let S(Q) denote the consumer gross surplus, where Q = qp + qg is the
industry total output. We assume that government can choose the public firm’s output level
qg and it can make a monetary transfer T to the public firm. Then, in the presence of the
shadow cost of public funds, the maximization problem of the government is:
max
qg ,T
W (qp, qg) = S(qp + qg)− Cg(qg)− Cp(qp)− λT
such that Π˜g = p(qp + qg)qg − Cg(qg)−Kg + T ≥ 0 (1)
where Π˜g is the public firm’s budget including the (positive or negative) transfer T . Notice that
the (participation) constraint (1) is not a hard budget balance constraint but it is compatible
with operative losses when T is positive. From (1) we get
T = Π˜g − [p(Q)qg − Cg(qg)−Kg]
and substituting T in the objective function we obtain:
max
qg
W = S(qp + qg)− Cg(qg)− Cp(qp)− λ
[
Π˜g − (p(Q)qg − Cg(qg)−Kg)
]
= S(qp + qg)− Cg(qg)− Cp(qp) + λ (p(Q)qg − Cg(qg)−Kg)− λΠ˜g
such that Π˜g ≥ 0
Since welfare is decreasing in Π˜g when λ is positive, it is optimal to set Π˜g = 0. Then, we
have:
T = − [p(Q)qg − Cg(qg)−Kg]
The problem can be rewritten unconstrained as follows:
max
qg
W = S(qp + qg)− Cg(qg)− Cp(qp) + λ (p(Q)qg − Cg(qg)−Kg)
Defining the consumer net surplus as
CS(Q) = S(Q)− p(Q)(qp + qg) (2)
and the public firm’s operative profit as
Πg (qg, qp) = p(Q)qg − Cg(qg)−Kg (3)
the maximization problem of the government is reduced to:
max
qg
W (qg, qp) = CS(Q) + Πp (qg, qp) + (1 + λ)Πg (qg, qp) (4)
So, the objective defined in equation (4) implies that a transfer occurs in order to guarantee
the public firm’s budget balance. This transfer is positive (negative) when the public firm’s
profits are negative (positive).
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The objective function (4) can be also interpreted as a weighted average of welfare, defined
as the net surplus generated in the market, and the public firm’s profit, where the former is
weighted by 1/(1 + λ), the latter by λ/(1 + λ).
W (qg, qp) = V (qg, qp) + λΠg (qg, qp) (5)
m
1
1 + λ
V (qg, qp) +
λ
1 + λ
Πg (qg, qp)
where V (qg, qp) = CS(Q) + Πg (qg, qp) + Πp (qg, qp)
We know that other works on mixed oligopoly consider a weighted average of welfare as
public firm’s objective function. In fact, if we had assumed a hard budget balance constraint
without a public transfer, as in Cremer et al. (1989), the weight given to the public firm’s profit
would have been endogenous and equal to the associate Lagrangian multiplier. Alternatively,
as in Hindriks and Claude (2006) the weight could be positively related to the endogenous share
of a partially privatized firm owned by private investors, while as in Matsumura (1998), due
to incentive problem between government and public management, in equilibrium a negative
relation may occur. In the present paper the weight of the public firm’s profit is exogenously
correlated to the shadow costs of public funds. In our analysis, introducing λ extends the
contract theory approach of public monopoly regulation to the case of (mixed) oligopoly.
The best-reply (or reaction) function of the private firm is derived, as usual, from the first
order condition:
∂Πp (qg, qp)
∂qp
= p (qg, qp) + p′ (qg, qp) qp = 0
In the presence of fixed costs, the private firm’s reaction function ought to be truncated
in the point it crosses the zero-isoprofit curve and on-the-boundary solutions can occur in
equilibrium. Given the model setting, it can be written explicitly in the following way:
rp(qg) =
{
1
2 (1− qg) if qg < qg
0 if qg ≥ qg
(6)
where qg = qg : Πp (rp (qg) , qg) = 0
The public firm’s first order condition can be derived from the objective (5):
∂W (qg, qp)
∂qg
=
∂V (qg, qp)
∂qg
+ λ
∂Πg (qg, qp)
∂qg
= [p (qg, qp)− c] + λ
[
p (qg, qp)− c+ p′ (qg, qp) qg
]
= 0
Notice that when λ = 0 public firm’s output decision follows the marginal cost pricing rule,
and the first term in square brackets measure its effect on total surplus (allocative effect). The
second term is the effect on the public firm’s profits, since the latter prevents the government
from using distortionary taxation to raise money (we call it the distortionary effect). When
λ→ +∞, the public firm plays as a private (Cournot) competitor.
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Since there is no hard budget balance constraint and its fixed cost Kg is sunk, the public
firm’s reaction function is not truncated and it can be explicitly derived:
rg(qp) = max
{
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
(1− c− qp) ; 0
}
(7)
However, we want to focus on the case in which both firms produce strictly positive quantities
when they play simultaneously; so, we provide some assumptions on the admissible set in the
parameters space.
Assumption 1 The parameters c and λ belong to the subspace
A ⊂ R× R =
{
(c, λ) |c ∈
(
0,
1
2
)
∨ λ ∈ [0, λ]}
where λ is a finite, reasonable value of the shadow cost of public funds.
Assumption 2 The private firm’s fixed cost Kp belongs to the subspace B ⊂ R =
[
0,Kp
]
,
where Kp is smaller than the producer surplus of the private firm in any (simultaneous or
sequential) equilibrium.
In Figure 1, the reaction functions are depicted. Coherently with the Assumptions 1 and
2, the intersection occurs in the interior of the parameters space where both firms produce
strictly positive quantities.
Figure 1: Firms’ reaction functions
An increase in λ has the effect of reducing both intercept and slope of the public firm’s
best-reply. When λ tends to infinite, the public firm plays as a profit maximizer.
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3 Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly
In this Section we investigate how the determination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus
sequential (Stackelberg) games is the result of preplay independent and simultaneous decisions
by the players.9
In many mixed oligopoly and privatization works, the timing of the competition (simulta-
neous or sequential) is generally assumed, and simultaneous playing is mostly adopted.10 Of
course, this assumption is not neutral and it affects the results and the policy prescriptions
on privatization. For example, without efficiency gains, in de Fraja and Delbono (1989) it is
shown that privatization never improves welfare when a Stackelberg game with public lead-
ership is played; on the contrary, privatization may be welfare improving in the simultaneous
setting. Then, the welfare impact of privatization crucially depends on the assumed timing.
More recently, other works introduced the idea that the order of play should result from
the players’ timing decision. In particular, in a private duopoly with strategic substitutability
it has been proved by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and by Amir and Grilo (1999) that
simultaneous play emerges as the unique equilibrium of the endogenous game. Conversely, in
a mixed duopoly Pal (1998) shows that sequential play always occurs in equilibrium.
Coherently with this approach, in order to endogenize the timing of the play, we use the
game with observable delay defined by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). In the first stage firms
simultaneously and independently choose the timing of action (whether to move early or late)
and then, once observing each other decision, they play the basic quantity game. The extensive
form of the game is represented in Figure 2.
Figure 2: The extensive form of the game with observable delay (Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990)
The relevant equilibrium concept is the subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) and each player
decides the timing of action according to the outcomes in the second stage (the basic game).
Of course, none of the firms can choose the type of competition by itself, but it can only
9Notice that in formal game-theoretical terms, Stackelberg’s proposal is not to be understood as a new
solution concept for one-shot games, but rather as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of a two-stage game of
perfect information with exogenously given first and second movers.
10In Cremer et al. (1989, p. 284), the reason for using a simultaneous timing is summarized as follows: “The
common use of the Nash equilibrium in industrial organization [...] suggests that this is at least as plausible as
the leader-follower situations [...].”
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eliminate some outcome. For example, if firm i decides to move early two outcomes are
possible according to the decision of the other player; only the Stackelberg outcome where
firm i is follower is ruled out by its decision.
Assuming existence and uniqueness of equilibria in each basic game, the following Propo-
sition summarizes the results obtained in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) for any two-player
game.
Proposition 3 Consider a two-player game for which the Nash and the two Stackelberg equi-
libria exist. Given that both players always prefer to be a Stackelberg leader than a simultaneous
player, the set of (pure strategy) SPE of the endogenous timing game is defined in the following
way:
i) if the Stackelberg follower payoff is lower than the Nash payoff for each firm, then the
unique SPE of the endogenous timing game is the Nash equilibrium where both firms decide
to move early;
ii) if the Stackelberg follower payoff is strictly larger than the Nash payoff for each firm,
then the both Stackelberg equilibria are SPE of the endogenous timing game;
iii) if firm i’s Stackelberg follower payoff is strictly larger than its Nash payoff and if firm
j prefers to play simultaneously than to be Stackelberg follower, then the unique SPE of the
endogenous timing game is the Stackelberg equilibrium with firm j being the leader.
Proof. The proof of this Proposition follows from Theorems II, III and IV in Hamilton and
Slutsky (1990).
The intuition behind these results is the following. Given that both firms prefer to be
leader than to play simultaneously, if the Nash payoff is higher than the follower payoff, then
any firm has a dominant strategy to move early. But if one firm prefers its follower payoff to
the Nash payoff, there is no dominant strategy: when the other player moves early it prefers
to move late and vice versa. This explains the three possible outcomes listed in Proposition
3.
We use Proposition 3 in order to determine the endogenous timing equilibrium, where the
existence and the uniqueness of the equilibria in each basic game are assured by Assumptions 1
and 2. The reduced form of the endogenous timing game for the mixed duopoly is represented
in Table 1.
Private Firm
Public Firm Early Late
Early WMN (.), ΠMNp (.) W
GL(.), ΠGLp (.)
Late WPL(.), ΠPLp (.) W
MN (.), ΠMNp (.)
Table 1: The reduced form of the endogenous timing game. MN, PL and GL stay respectively
for Nash, Private Leadership and Public Leadership equilibria.
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In order to solve the game we need to compare the equilibrium payoffs in each basic game.
In what follows the simultaneous and sequential equilibria are derived.
3.1 Simultaneous equilibrium
When firms play simultaneously, the equilibrium output levels solve the system of the best-
reply functions (6) and (7). We refer to this equilibrium as a mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium
and the equilibrium values are labeled by MN. The output levels and the price in equilibrium
are
qMNg = (1 + λ)
(1− 2c)
(3λ+ 1)
; qMNp = c+ λ
(1− 2c)
(3λ+ 1)
QMN = (1− c)− λ (1− 2c)
(3λ+ 1)
; pMN = c+ λ
(1− 2c)
(3λ+ 1)
Notice that when λ = 0, the public firm’s equilibrium output is such that the market price
is always equal to its marginal cost. It means that the public firm implements a total output
level equal to the one derived in the case of a welfare maximizer (but inefficient) monopoly;
but now the welfare is higher.11 Moreover, when the public firm is as efficient as the private
one, the first best solution is implemented.
As λ increases, the public firm equilibrium output qMNg decreases and q
MN
p increases;
then, the industry total cost decreases enhancing productive efficiency. This is because the
public firm’s concern for public transfers serves as a credible commitment to decrease its
output. Moreover, since the best-reply functions are contractions, the total output level,
QMN , decreases and the market price pMN increases. It is obvious that the effect on consumer
surplus is negative, raising an allocative inefficiency.12 The private firm’s profit and welfare
represent the payoffs of the players and in the simultaneous case are:
ΠMNp =
(
c+λ(1+c)
3λ+1
)2 −Kp (8)
WMN = 1−2c(1+λ)(1+2λ)
2+c2(1+λ)2(3+8λ)+2λ(3+λ(5+λ))
2(3λ+1)2
− (1 + λ)Kg −Kp (9)
3.2 Sequential equilibria
A Stackelberg equilibrium of this game corresponds to the SPE of a two stage game of perfect
information in which the second mover (follower) chooses an action after having observed the
action of the first mover (leader). Then, the Stackelberg equilibrium imposes that: (i) the
strategy of the second mover is a selection from its reaction function; and (ii) the first mover
chooses an action that maximizes its objective given the anticipation of the rival’s reaction.
In what follows we first analyze the case of public leadership and then the private leadership
equilibrium.
11This is because the same total output is partially produced by the more efficient private competitor.
12There exists a clear trade off between technical and allocative efficiency, and the net effect on total surplus
is ambiguous and depends on the parameters.
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qGLp q
GL
g Π
GL
p
c < 1+2λ4(1+λ)
2c(1+λ)+λ
(1+4λ)
(1+2λ)−4c(1+λ)
(1+4λ)
(2c(1+λ)+λ)2
(1+4λ)2
−Kp
c ≥ 1+2λ4(1+λ) 12 0 14 −Kp
WGL
c < 1+2λ4(1+λ)
1
2
(4λ−2c−6cλ+4c2+λ2−4cλ2+8c2λ+4c2λ2+1)
(1+4λ) − (1 + λ)Kg −Kp
c ≥ 1+2λ4(1+λ) 38 − (1 + λ)Kg −Kp
Table 2: The public leadership (GL) equilibrium quantities, profits and welfare.
Public leadership (GL).
When the public firm moves before its private competitor, the equilibrium quantities solve
the following equation system:
qGLg = arg maxW (qg, rp(qg))
qGLp = rp(q
GL
g )
The solution is:
qGLg = max
{
(1 + 2λ)− 4c (1 + λ)
(1 + 4λ)
, 0
}
qGLp =
1
2
(
1− qGLg
)
We have to distinguish two cases since there exists a threshold value of the marginal cost
of the public firm such that ∀c ∈
(
0, 1+2λ4(1+λ)
)
the public firm produces a positive quantity in
equilibrium. When c ∈
[
1+2λ
4(1+λ) ,
1
2
)
, the public firm prefers not to produce and the private
firm acts as a monopolist: its quantity, market price, and welfare are the same as in a private
monopoly.
Since the threshold value 1+2λ4(1+λ) is increasing, as λ increases an higher level of inefficiency
is compatible with positive production by the public firm. In Table 2 quantities, profits and
welfare in the public leadership equilibrium are summarized.
Private leadership (PL).
Assume that the private firm moves before its public competitor, that is, it behaves as
a leader in the Stackelberg game. The equilibrium quantities solve the following equation
system:
qPLp = arg max Πp (rg(qp), qp)
qPLg = rg(q
PL
p )
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qPLp q
PL
g Π
PL
p
c < λ3λ+1
1
2
(c+λ+cλ)
λ
(λ−c−3cλ)(1+λ)
2λ(1+2λ)
1
4
(c+λ+cλ)2
λ(2λ+1) −Kp
c ≥ λ3λ+1 1− c 0 c(1− c)−Kp
WPL
c < λ3λ+1
(4λ−4cλ+4c2+8λ2+λ3−10cλ2+17c2λ−6cλ3+22c2λ2+9c2λ3)
8(2λ+1)λ − (1 + λ)Kg −Kp
c ≥ λ3λ+1 12 − 12c2 − (1 + λ)Kg −Kp
Table 3: The private leadership (PL) equilibrium values of quantities, profits and welfare.
The solution is:
qPLp = min
{
1
2
(c+ λ+ cλ)
λ
, 1− c
}
qPLg =
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
(
1− c− qPLp
)
As before, we have two different cases depending on the value of c. ∀c ∈
(
0, λ3λ+1
)
the
public firm produces a positive quantity in equilibrium; more precisely, it is optimal for the
private leader to choose a quantity such that the public firm’s best response is positive. When
c ∈
[
λ
3λ+1 ,
1
2
)
the public firm does not produce in equilibrium and the private firm plays as a
public (inefficient) monopolist: its quantity, as a limit level, is such that the market price is
equal to the marginal cost of the public firm.13 Of course total surplus is higher because the
private competitor produces more efficiently.
Moreover, as λ increases, a larger inefficiency is compatible with a positive production by
the public firm. In Table 3 quantities, profits and welfare in the private leadership equilibrium
are summarized.
3.3 Endogenous timing equilibria
In this section we derive the endogenous timing equilibria of the mixed duopoly game. In
order to apply Proposition 3 we need to rank the private and public firms’ payoff in the
different equilibria. In particular, in Lemma 4 we compare the private firm’s profit under
public leadership (i.e., the follower payoff) and in the Nash equilibrium, while in Lemma 5 we
compare welfare under private leadership (again the follower payoff) with the one in the Nash
equilibrium. It is worth noting that these comparisons are sufficient to apply Proposition 3.
In fact, any player always prefers to be leader than to play simultaneously, by the nature of
Stackelberg equilibria. Moreover, the comparison between the leader and the follower payoff
is useless since no firm can unilaterally switch from one sequential equilibrium to the other.
13This is the standard case when λ = 0: the public follower can always produce the quantity needed to achieve
this target and, anticipating this strategy, the best action for the private firm is to produce that quantity.
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Lemma 4 There exists a subspace F1 = (c,λ) ⊆ A, such that the private firm strictly prefers
the public leadership equilibrium to the mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium. In the subspace F̂1 =
A− F1 the reverse is true.
This result totally relies on the choice of the public leader to produce more or less than
in the simultaneous equilibrium; and this choice depends on the public firm’s objective being
increasing or decreasing in the rival’s output in the Nash equilibrium point.
In fact, private firm’s profit is strictly decreasing in the public firm’s output in any in-
terior point14, and so, if qPLg < q
MN
g , the private firm prefers to be follower than to play
simultaneously.
The public leader chooses to produce a smaller quantity with respect to the Nash equi-
librium if ∂W (qg ,qp)∂qp > 0 in the Nash equilibrium. In fact, if its objective is increasing in the
quantity produced by the rival, the public leader prefers to reduce its quantity anticipating
that the private firm will increase the output, enhancing in this way the welfare.15
∂W (qg, qp)
∂qp
=
∂V
∂qp
+ λ
∂Πg
∂qp
= p (qg, qp) + λp′ (qg, qp) qg = p (qg, qp)− λqg
In the Nash equilibrium:
∂W (qg, qp)
∂qp
∣∣∣∣
(qMNg ,qMNp )
= c+ λ
(1− 2c)
(3λ+ 1)
− λ (1 + λ) (1− 2c)
(3λ+ 1)
=
c
(
2λ2 + 3λ+ 1
)− λ2
(3λ+ 1)
Then, ∂W (qg ,qp)∂qp
∣∣∣
(qMNg ,qMNp )
> 0 if c > λ
2
2λ2+3λ+1
.
This result occurs when the increase in productive efficiency due to the shift of some
production to the private firms outweighs the negative allocative efficiency effect due to the
reduction in total quantity and the negative distortionary effect due to the reduction in profits.
The threshold c (λ) is increasing because, as λ increases, the distortionary effect makes the
public firm more willing to produce a larger quantity. So, only if c is high enough the overall
effect of shifting some production to the efficient private competitor is positive.
Lemma 5 There exists a subspace F2 = (c,λ) ⊆ A, such that the public firm strictly prefers
the private leadership equilibrium to the mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium. In the subspace
F̂2 = A− F2 the reverse is true.
As in the previous Lemma, this result has to do with the fact that W (qg, qp) may be
increasing in qp. But now what matters is the decision of the private leader, that always
increases its output with respect to the Nash equilibrium. As a result, total output increases
14Indeed, ∂Πp (qg, qp) /∂qg = p
′ (qg, qp) qp < 0 ∀qp > 0.
15Note that welfare increases despite the total quantity reduction.
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and the allocative efficiency effect is positive. Recalling that moving from Nash to the public
leadership equilibrium had a negative allocative efficiency effect, we would expect that the
parameter space F2 is larger F1. This intuition is confirmed by the comparison of the thresholds
c (λ) and c (λ). In fact,
c (λ) =
3λ2 + 7λ3
21λ+ 34λ2 + 17λ3 + 4
<
λ2
2λ2 + 3λ+ 1
= c (λ) ∀λ ∈ (0, λ)
Then, F1 ⊂ F2.
In the following Theorem the different SPE of the endogenous timing game are derived.
Theorem 6 Consider a mixed duopoly game in which the order of moves is endogenous. The
SPE of the endogenous timing game are defined in the following way:
a) When (c, λ) ∈ F̂2, the mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium is the unique SPE of the endogenous
timing game;
b) When (c, λ) ∈ F̂1 ∩ F2, the unique SPE of the endogenous timing game is the Stackelberg
equilibrium with the private firm acting as leader;
c) When (c, λ) ∈ F1, both Stackelberg outcomes are the (pure strategy) SPE of the endogenous
timing game.
Figure 3: SPE of the endogenous timing game in the space of parameters (c, λ)
Figure 3 depicts the three possible outcomes of the endogenous timing game in the space
(c, λ). Without considering λ, the previous literature (Pal, 1998) defines a unique solution
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where both sequential equilibria are SPE. The novel contribution of our analysis is to enlarge
the set of possible outcomes defining conditions under which either private leadership or Nash
equilibrium may arise as the unique SPE. The intuition is straightforward. Since the public
firm’s objective function is a weighted average of total surplus and profits, for low values of
λ (given c) our result coincides with Pal’s; for high values of λ (given c), the public firm
mimics the private firm’s behavior and we obtain the same results as Amir and Grilo (1999)
in a private duopoly. For intermediate values of λ, private leadership is the unique SPE since
the public firm is more willing to accept a reduction in its own output when total quantity
increases (in the PL equilibrium) than when total output decreases (in the GL equilibrium).
Moreover, when we focus on the sequential outcomes, the introduction of λ increases the
level of inefficiency compatible with a strictly positive quantity produced by the public firm
in equilibrium. In particular, in the private leadership case, Pal (1998) shows that the public
firm never produces and its presence has a mere strategical role that induces the competitor to
produce the limit quantity. In our framework, taking into account the shadow cost of public
funds, the public firm usually produces a positive quantity in equilibrium.16
3.4 Equilibrium selection
In the subspace F1 the endogenous timing game of the mixed duopoly has two pure-strategy
Nash equilibria. Then, this is a standard coordination game with two pure-strategy Nash
equilibria and one mixed-strategy equilibrium. We now analyze the pure-strategy equilibrium
selection problem according to the risk dominance criterion developed by Harsanyi and Selten
(1988).17 Applied to coordination games with two pure-strategy equilibria, this procedure
picks the equilibrium that has the largest basin of attraction in the initial beliefs of the players
on each other’s behavior. In other words, it minimizes the risk of a coordination failure due
to the strategic uncertainty that players face in a coordination game (Amir and Stepanova,
2006). This criterion proved to be a powerful selection concept in experimental settings of
coordination games (Cooper et al., 1990; Van Huyck et al., 1990) and in evolutionary games
characterized by experimentation and myopic learning (Ellison, 1993; Kandori et al., 1993). It
is shown that the risk dominant equilibrium is often selected even when it is Pareto dominated
by another equilibrium. One equilibrium risk-dominates the other if it is associated with the
larger product of deviation losses. In our framework this means that private leadership is
selected using the risk-dominance criterion if(
WPL −WMN) (ΠPLp −ΠMNp ) > (WGL −WMN) (WGL −ΠMNp ) (10)
Theorem 7 The private leadership equilibrium risk-dominates the public leadership equilib-
rium ∀ (c, λ) ∈ F1.
16This is true as far as the public firm is not too inefficient. This result enhances the realism of our approach
where the public firm represents not only a threat of producing, but it has an active role in the industry.
17In the present setting it is possible to show that the standard refinements of Nash equilibrium for normal
form games – perfection, properness and strategic stability – cannot be invoked to rule out one of the pure
strategy SPE.
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Then, the risk dominance criterion selects in the whole set F1 the same equilibrium that
the Pareto dominance criterion is able to select only in a subspace of F1. It is important
to highlight that the risk-dominance criterion is applied to the reduced game, and not to
the entire two-stage game of endogenous timing, and the two options are a priori entirely
different. However, since each subgame has a unique Nash equilibrium and given the use of
subgame perfection in this framework, our application of the risk-dominance criterion on the
reduced game seems to us rather natural.18 Amir and Stepanova (2006) suggest the following
interpretation: the private leadership equilibrium is chosen by firms that wish to minimize the
risk of coordination failure in their timing decisions.
The preference for the private leadership equilibrium is the main contribution in Beato
and Mas-Colell (1984), where it is assumed that the public firm is committed to a decision
rule (in their case the marginal-cost pricing rule), and the private firm maximizes its own
profit given the decision rule of the public competitor. In the present setting, using the
game with observable delay of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) coupled with risk dominance as a
selection criterion, we show that the private leadership equilibrium emerges as the endogenous
equilibrium in the mixed duopoly ∀ (c, λ) ∈ F2.
4 Welfare effect of privatization
In this Section we perform a comparative statics exercise in order to analyze the effects of pri-
vatization on welfare taking into account the result of the previous Section on the endogenous
timing equilibrium.
By privatization we consider the case in which the public firm is sold by the government
and the management is instructed by the new owners to maximize profits:19
Πg (qg, qp) = [p (qg, qp)− c] qg
This change in ownership might have in principle the effect of enhancing the productive ef-
ficiency of the former public firm. We consider the two extreme cases in which either no
efficiency gain or full efficiency are achieved. In the first case, the privatized firm retains the
same technology as before; in the latter, it is able to produce at the same marginal cost of its
competitor, here normalized to zero. After privatization, the new reaction function of firm g
is:
rg(qp) = max
{
1
2
(1− c− qp) , 0
}
(11)
18See van Damme and Hurkens (2004) and Amir and Stepanova (2006) for the application of the risk-
dominance criterion on the reduced game of endogenous timing models in price game duopolies.
19As in the mixed duopoly case, we assume that the fixed cost is sunk and already paid by the government. So,
it is included in the welfare, weighted (1 + λ), but not in the privatized firm’s profit. Moreover, For simplicity,
we keep the same subscripts as in the mixed oligopoly framework. From now on, g stands for the privatized
firm.
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with c = 0 in the case of full efficiency gains. Comparing the reaction function before (7) and
after privatization, it is easy to see that it becomes steeper. Indeed:
1 + λ
1 + 2λ
>
1
2
∀λ ∈ (0, λ)
and only when λ→∞ the slope of (7) converges to (6).
Absent efficiency gains, also the intercept is reduced after privatization. With full efficiency
gains the intercept increases only when c > 12(1+λ) .
The change in the reaction function is not the only effect of privatization. In fact, we have
to consider the (possible) change in the endogenous timing equilibrium. In order to derive the
SPE of the game after privatization, we can rely on the results in Amir and Grilo (1999) that
apply the same endogenous timing structure to a private duopoly. The following Proposition
summarizes the result.
Proposition 8 Consider a private duopoly quantity game with strategic substitutes. When
the values of the parameters are in the admissible set A, the unique SPE of the endogenous
timing game is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium where both firms decide to move early.
Proof of Proposition 8. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 no Nash equilibrium lies on the
boundary, i.e. no firm produces zero output. In this case we can apply Theorem 2.2 in
Amir and Grilo (1999) that proves that both firms prefer always to be simultaneous player
than Stackelberg follower. So, according to point i) Proposition 3, the unique SPE of the
endogenous timing game is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
The intuition for this result is clear. Since the firm’s profit is strictly decreasing in the
rival’s output, a private leader always increases its own quantity in comparison with the
Cournot-Nash quantity. By the same reason, a private follower is always strictly worse off
with respect to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Then, sequential play is only sustainable in a
mixed duopoly.
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is the solution of the system of equations (6) and (11).
Quantities and price are:20
qCNg =
1− 2c
3
; qCNp =
1 + c
3
QCN =
2− c
3
; pCN =
1 + c
3
In our analysis the new owners are always national. The (domestic) total surplus and the
privatized firm’s profit are:
V CN =
8− 8c+ 11c2
18
−Kg −Kp; ΠCNg =
(
1− 2c
3
)2
20Superscript CN stands for Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
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In the case of full efficient privatization, recall that c = 0.
In order to compare welfare before and after privatization, the price paid to the government
for buying the firm matters. Since we are taking into account the shadow cost of public funds,
it is not indifferent whether profits are public or private, and if the government is able to
raise enough money from privatization. Given the equilibrium after privatization, the more
money the government is able to raise by selling the public firm, the higher the welfare after
the privatization. In the first instance, we give full bargaining power to the government; i.e.,
it is able to extract the whole profit from the privatized firm. In this case, total welfare in the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium is:
WCN =
1
18
(
2λ+ 11c2 + 8− 8c (1 + λ− cλ))− (1 + λ)Kg −Kp (12)
The following theorem states the result of the comparison when no efficiency gain occurs
after privatization.
Theorem 9 Consider a mixed duopoly game in which the order of moves is endogenous. In
addition, assume that by privatization the firm does not achieve any efficiency gain and all
the profits are extracted by the government. Then, privatization always reduces welfare.
This result is in sharp contrast with those obtained assuming simultaneous playing. For
example, de Fraja and Delbono (1989) show that assuming Cournot competition privatization
may enhance welfare absent efficiency gains.21 The same result holds in the framework of
the present paper. Disregarding the endogenous timing game, and comparing WMN from
equation (9) and WCN from equation (12) ∀ (c, λ) ∈ A, privatization may increase welfare.
More precisely, it occurs when
c > 4λ+6λ
2+1
26λ+12λ2+8
Now, we move the analysis to the other extreme case: full efficient privatization. The
following Theorem formalizes the result.
Theorem 10 Consider a mixed duopoly game in which the order of moves is endogenous. In
addition, assume that by privatization the firm achieves full efficiency and all the profits are
extracted by the government. Then, there exists a subset of the parameter J ⊂ A, such that
the privatization reduces welfare.
In Figure 4 we graph the set J in the parameters’ space where a fully efficient privatiza-
tion reduces welfare. Endogenizing the timing of competition, before and after privatization,
enlarges this space with respect to the simultaneous case. In fact, it is easy to show that,
assuming simultaneous competition, privatization reduces welfare if
c <
3(1+2λ)2−(1+3λ)
√
2(3+8λ(1+λ))
3(1+λ)(3+8λ)
21This result is obtained in a different setting with symmetric firms and increasing marginal costs.
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Figure 4: The welfare effect of a full efficient privatization: in gray the space of the parameters
in (c, λ) in which privatization reduces welfare when the government extracts all the profits
from the privatized firm
It is interesting to notice that the level of c such that public ownership is the dominant solution
in terms of welfare is decreasing in λ. This occurs because, as λ increases, the profit motivation
has a larger weight in the public firm’s decision. So, the allocative efficiency effect of the public
ownership decreases and the productive efficiency effect of the privatization becomes more and
more important. Thus, we can say that the more the public firm behaves as a profit maximizer,
the better is to privatize it. This result is obtained assuming that the government is able to
extract the whole profit from the new owners of the privatized firm. Suppose now that the
government is able to take just half of the profit. How the previous result are affected? In
Figure 4 we can see how the space of the parameters such that the privatization reduces welfare
is enlarged. The dashed line delimits the space of a welfare-reducing full efficient privatization
when the government sells the public firm at a price equal to half of the future profits.
An extreme result occurs when the firm is sold for free. In this latter case, a full efficient
privatization always lowers welfare.
5 Conclusions
The aim of the present work is to characterize the equilibrium and analyze the effect of pri-
vatization in a mixed duopoly where an (inefficient) welfare-maximizing public firm competes
in the quantities with a domestic private one.
We do not assume the timing of competition a priori. Rather, we endogenize the deter-
mination of simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) versus sequential (Stackelberg) games by applying
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the Hamilton and Slutsky (1990)’s model to this mixed duopoly framework.
Since we mainly refer to public utility markets open to competition, we assume that firms’
production is characterized by increasing return to scale, with fixed cost and constant marginal
cost. In this framework, we define the objective function of the public firm assuming that its
management is instructed to maximize welfare taking into account the shadow cost of public
funds. As the following citation suggests, this approach has been generally used to characterize
public monopolies running a deficit.
[M]any public enterprises are natural monopolies, i.e. firms that exhibit increas-
ing returns to scale. Once it has been proved desirable to run such an enterprise
at all, its product should be priced at marginal cost provided the resulting deficit
can be financed through lump-sum taxes. If there are not lump-sum, discrepancies
between consumer and producer taxes will result in inefficiencies in the rest of
the economy. (...) This has been taken as an argument for requiring the public
enterprise to cover, by its own means, at least part of its deficit. (Marchand et al.,
1984)
We believe that extending this approach to the mixed duopoly framework is rather natural
and fills, at least partially, some gaps of the previous literature. Indeed, discussing the results
of their paper, Beato and Mas-Colell (1984, p. 82) state:
Finally, the limitations of this paper and the need for further work should be
clear. We have, for example, ruled out both fixed cost and the general equilibrium
effects of distortions in other markets. We don’t know if reasonable versions of the
main results of this paper [...] are available in these richer settings.
The extensive process of privatization started in the eighties of the last century and still in
place nowadays is essentially driven by the belief that private discipline and profit motivation
can enhance efficiency. Moreover, privatization is also considered as a powerful instrument to
raise money to reducing distortionary taxation. In this work we confute the general extent
of these ideas. We show that, absent efficiency gains, privatization never increases welfare,
and that an inefficient public firm may be preferred even when large efficiency gains could be
realized by privatization. These result are obtained assuming that both private firm’s profits
and privatization proceeds are substitute for distortionary taxation. The distortionary model
applied to the mixed oligopoly framework is not less important for our results. While after
privatization only the simultaneous (Nash-Cournot) equilibrium can be implemented, with a
public firm sequential outcomes – that are always welfare superior – may be sustained as SPE
of the endogenous timing game. Therefore, privatization changes not only the ownership and
the objective function of the public firm, but also the type of competition in the market.
Finally, the assumption of public firm inefficiency deserves a last comment.
From a theoretical point of view, the relationship between ownership and economic ef-
ficiency is still an open question. Theoretical support to privatization was provided by the
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theory of incentives that demonstrated how agency problems in state-owned enterprises can
cause larger inefficiencies than in private-owned firms. In fact, profit maximizing owners
subject to threats of bankruptcy and takeover have stronger incentives to reduce costs than
politicians or bureaucrats. They would motivate and monitor appointed managers more effi-
ciently than when there are wider and sometimes distorted objectives, soft budget constraints
and complicated chains of command (World Bank, ed, 1995). In addition, Sappington and
Stiglitz (1987) presents the “fundamental privatization theorem” providing conditions under
which government production cannot improve upon private production. Nowadays, modern
theory is less dogmatic in this respect (see Estrin and Pe´rotin, 1991). For example, an owner-
manager would indeed have strong incentives to cut costs. But to privatize a managerial
firm may increase costs, because the profit motive can reduce the incentive to pay for lower
managerial slack (de Fraja, 1993; Willner, 2003). Public ownership may in some models mean
excessive labour intensity and private ownership the opposite, with ambiguous consequences
for overall productivity (see Pint, 1991). The ranking of ownership is sensitive to details in
the objective function and reward schedule if low performance means that the manager is
fired (Willner and Parker, 2007). Also, privatization often requires regulation, and hence an
additional agency problem that may sometimes cost more than public ownership (Laffont and
Tirole, 1991; Shapiro and Willig, 2001).
From an empirical point of view the picture is quite mixed.22 Most of the works report
an increase in profitability after the privatization, but the evidence of productive efficiency
improvements is less clear and the variance of the results is substantial (Cuervo and Villalonga,
2000).
6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4. Comparing the equilibrium profits ΠGLp in Table 2 with Π
MN
p in
equation (8), it easy to check that ∀λ ≥ 0:
(i) ∀c ∈
(
0, 1+2λ4(1+λ)
)
ΠGLp −ΠMNp > 0 ∀c > c (λ)
where
c (λ) =
λ2
2λ2 + 3λ+ 1
with
∂c (λ)
∂λ
> 0.
(ii) ∀c ∈
[
1+2λ
4(1+λ) ,
1
2
)
, ΠGLp −ΠMNp > 0 always.
Thus, we define the subspace F1 and F̂1 as follows:
F1 = {(c, λ) ⊆ A|c > c (λ)} and F̂1 = {(c, λ) ⊆ A|c ≤ c (λ)} (13)
22See for example the reviews of Megginson and Netter (2001) and Willner (2001) that report the results of
hundreds of empirical papers on privatization and on the comparison of private and public ownership.
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Proof of Lemma 5. Comparing the welfare level WPL in Table 3 with WMN in equation
(9), it easy to check that ∀λ ∈ (λ):23
(i) ∀c ∈
(
0, λ3λ+1
)
WPL −WMN > 0 ∀c > c (λ)
where
c (λ) =
3λ2 + 7λ3
21λ+ 34λ2 + 17λ3 + 4
with
∂c (λ)
∂λ
> 0
(ii) ∀c ∈
[
λ
3λ+1 ,
1
2
)
,
WPL −WMN > 0 ∀λ ∈ (0, λ)
Thus, we define the subspace F2 and F̂2 as follows:
F2 = {(c, λ) ⊆ A|c > c (λ)} and F̂2 = {(c, λ) ⊆ A|c ≤ c (λ)} (14)
Proof of Theorem 6.
a) When (c, λ) ∈ F̂1 the private firm prefers the mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium to the
public leadership equilibrium. When (c, λ) ∈ F̂2 the public firm is better off in the Nash
equilibrium than in the private leadership equilibrium. Therefore, in the intersection
space F̂1 ∩ F̂2, no firm wants to be follower. Since ∀λ ∈
(
0, λ
)
, c (λ) < c (λ), it follows
that F̂2 ⊂ F̂1; then F̂1 ∩ F̂2 coincides with F̂2. Given that each player always prefers to
be the Stackelberg leader than a simultaneous player, point i) of Proposition 3 applies
and the mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium is the unique SPE of the endogenous timing
game.
b) When (c, λ) ∈ F̂1 the private firm prefers the mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium to the
public leadership equilibrium. When (c, λ) ∈ F2 the public firm is better off in the
private leadership equilibrium than in the mixed duopoly Nash equilibrium. So, point
iii) of Proposition 3 applies and the Stackelberg equilibrium with the private firm acting
as leader is the unique SPE of the endogenous timing game.
c) When (c, λ) ∈ F1 the private firm prefers to play as Stackelberg follower than to play
simultaneously. When (c, λ) ∈ F2 the public firm prefers to play as Stackelberg follower
than to play simultaneously. Since∀λ > 0, c (λ) < c (λ), it follows that F1 ⊂ F2; then
F1 ∩ F2 coincides with F1. So, point ii) of Proposition 3 applies and both Stackelberg
equilibria belong to the set of the (pure strategy) SPE of the endogenous timing game.
23The threshold c < λ
3λ+1
∀λ < 5.37228. Since λ is a measure of the distortion by taxation, we are comfortable
assuming that λ is lower than 5.37228. If λ ≥ 5.37228 we would have that WPL < WMN always.
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Proof of Theorem 7. In order to prove the result we need to consider three cases depending
on the fact that boundary solutions may occur in the two sequential equilibria. By comparing
the thresholds defined in Section 3.2, we have the following equilibria:
(i) when (c, λ) ∈ F1 and c < λ1+3λ , both Stackelberg equilibria are interior. Then, the values
of WGL, ΠGLp , W
PLand ΠPLp of interest are those in the first row of Tables 2 and 3.
(ii) when (c, λ) ∈ F1 and λ1+3λ < c < 1+2λ4(1+λ) , the public firm does not produce in the pri-
vate leadership equilibrium while it produces positive quantity in the public leadership
equilibrium. Then, the values of WGL and ΠGLp of interest are are those in the first row
of Table 2, while for WPLand ΠPLp we have to consider the values in the second row of
Table 3.
(iii) when (c, λ) ∈ F1 and c > 1+2λ4(1+λ) , the public firm does not produce in both Stackelberg
equilibria. Then, the values of WGL, ΠGLp , W
PLand ΠPLp of interest are those in the
second row of Tables 2 and 3.
Applying the criterion (10), straightforward but tedious computations show the result.
Proof of Theorem 9. In order to prove the result, we need to consider three cases: (i)
Nash is the relevant equilibrium of the mixed duopoly; (ii) private leadership is the relevant
equilibrium of the mixed duopoly with an interior solution;and (iii) private leadership with
the public firm not producing is the relevant equilibrium of the mixed duopoly.
(i) By point a) in Theorem 6 Nash is the relevant equilibrium of the mixed duopoly game
when (c, λ) ∈ F̂2. So, we have to compare WMN , defined in equation (9) with WCN
(equation 12). Straightforward computations show that
WMN > WCN ∀ (c, λ) ∈ F̂2
(ii) By points b) and c) in Theorem 6 and Theorem 7 the Stackelberg outcome with the
private firm as leader is the relevant SPE of the mixed duopoly game when (c, λ) ∈ F2.
Moreover, when c < λ3λ+1 the public firm produces positive quantity in the equilibrium.
Then, we have to compare the value of WPL in the first row of Table 3 with WCN
(equation 12). Straightforward computations show that
WPL > WCN ∀ (c, λ) ∈ F2, c < λ3λ+ 1
(iii) When c ≥ λ3λ+1 , the public firm does not produce in the private leadership equilibrium.
Thus, we have to compare the value of WPL in the second row of Table 3 with WCN
(equation 12). Straightforward computations show that
WPL > WCN ∀ (c, λ) ∈ F2, c > λ3λ+ 1
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Proof of Theorem 10. When the privatized firm achieves full efficiency gains, welfare after
privatization is:
WCN
∣∣
c=0
=
4 + λ
9
− (1 + λ)Kg −Kp (15)
In order to prove the result we have to distinguish between three cases as in Theorem 9.
(i) By point a) in Theorem 6 Nash is the relevant equilibrium of the mixed duopoly game
when (c, λ) ∈ F̂2. So, we have to compare WMN , defined in equation (9) with WCN
(equation 15). Straightforward computations show that
WMN ≥ WCN ∣∣
c=0
∀ (c, λ) ∈ F̂2, c < 3(1+2λ)
2−(1+3λ)
√
2(3+8λ(1+λ))
3(1+λ)(3+8λ)
Thus, we can define the subset
J1 =
{
(c, λ) ∈ F̂2
∣∣∣ c < 3(1+2λ)2−(1+3λ)√2(3+8λ(1+λ))3(1+λ)(3+8λ) }
Referring to the definition of the subset F̂2 in (14), it is easy to check that J1 is a
nonempty set.
(ii) By points b) and c) in Theorem 6 and Theorem 7 the private leadership equilibrium is the
relevant SPE of the mixed duopoly game when (c, λ) ∈ F2. Moreover, when c < λ3λ+1
the public firm produces positive quantity in the equilibrium. Then, we have to compare
the value of WPL in the first row of Table 3 with WCN (equation 15). First of all, define
F2a =
{
(c, λ) ∈ F2|c < λ3λ+ 1
}
Straightforward computations show that:
WPL ≥ WCN ∣∣
c=0
∀ (c, λ) ∈ F2a, 9c2 (1 + λ)2 (4 + 9λ)− 18cλ (1 + λ) (2 + 3λ) + 4λ− 7λ3 > 0
Thus we can define the subset
J2a =
{
(c, λ) ∈ F2a| 9c2 (1 + λ)2 (4 + 9λ)− 18cλ (1 + λ) (2 + 3λ) + 4λ− 7λ3 > 0
}
that is nonempty.
(iii) Defining
F2b =
{
(c, λ) ∈ F2|c ≥ λ3λ+ 1
}
the public firm does not produce in the private leadership equilibrium. Then, we have
to compare the value of WPL in the second row of Table 3 with WCN (equation 15).
Straightforward computations show that the subset J2b ⊂ F2b such that privatization
reduces welfare is not empty.
J2b =
{
(c, λ) ∈ F2b|c < 13
√
1− 2λ⇔WPrL −WFE ≥ 0
}
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Then, the subset of parameters’ values such that a full efficient privatization with full
bargaining power to the government reduces welfare is the following:
J = J1 ∪ J2a ∪ J2b
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